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Abstract  
 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a new mechanism for delivering public services. This paper 
reviews the emerging SIB literature in high-income settings. It identifies three distinct 
narratives: a public sector reform narrative; a financial sector reform narrative; and a 
cautionary narrative. These are analysed relative to three themes: public versus private 
values; outcomes contracting; and risk allocation. The first two narratives are complementary 
and offer a ‘win-win’ portrayal of SIBs. The third narrative challenges this dominant 
commentary by highlighting potential risks. There is limited empirical evidence on active 
SIBs to support these narratives. SIBs may have the potential to align public and private 
interests while improving outcomes for people affected by entrenched social problems, but 
this is yet to be established and appears less probable than the third more cautionary 
narrative. More empirical research is needed to consider the potential risks, drawbacks, 
benefits and alternatives of SIBs in different settings.  
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Introduction 
 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a new mechanism for the delivery of public services. SIBs 
usually involve four different parties: commissioners – normally central or local government 
bodies responsible for ensuring relevant services are made available to target populations; 
service providers who will deliver the services commissioned; external investors who cover 
(all or some of) the upfront costs of service provision, in exchange for a commitment by 
commissioners to re-pay their initial investment plus a return if pre-defined target outcomes 
are achieved; and specialist intermediaries who are often involved in developing the project, 
securing the contract with commissioners, facilitating investment and managing the project’s 
delivery. Given the emphasis on outcomes, a SIB contract can specify the appointment of an 
independent evaluator responsible for measuring the effects of the intervention provided to 
the target population compared with a control population not receiving the service.  
 
The term ‘Social Impact Bond’ is misleading. SIBs do not follow the financial logic of a 
‘bond’, as the return is contingent, rather like equity, on the outturn of the projects being 
financed.  And there is as yet no indication that any significant financial market for SIBs may 
develop between financiers, after the project is initially established. SIBs frequently focus on 
the prevention or reduction of challenging social problems - for example, reducing crime 
through targeted anti-recidivism programmes - as in Peterborough in the UK (Disley et al, 
2011) and Rikers Island in the US (Rudd et al, 2013), reducing youth unemployment rates by 
improving young people’s skills, as in Nottingham and London in the UK (DWP, 2014), 
Utah in the USA, and Rotterdam in the Netherlands (Goodall, 2014)  or reducing loneliness 
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amongst the elderly through befriending schemes as in Worcester in the UK (Tan et al, 
2015). The emphasis on prevention relates in large part to the idea that all or part of the pay-
out by the public commissioner to the investor will be funded from actual or hypothetical 
‘savings’ in public service budgets generated by improving outcomes (e.g. lower recidivism 
rates will accrue savings in police, courts, prison, probation, etc.). Those who invest may be 
seeking a financial or social return on their investment – in reality these goals may or may not 
be aligned. Opinion is divided with both enthusiasm and caution around the potential that 
SIBs may hold for financing complex social interventions and reallocating performance and 
financial risk from the public towards the private sector. For some, the SIB represents, in 
theory, a solution to postulated public sector sluggishness by introducing private sector 
entrepreneurship and linking the traditionally separate private financial and social services 
sectors (Mulgan et al, 2011; Cohen, 2011). For others, it represents the worst of both sectors, 
involving the ‘financialization’ (a process whereby both macroeconomic and public 
policymaking are subordinated to financial sector interests) of the public sector (Lake, 2015; 
Dowling and Harvie, 2014) and perverse incentivisation of the philanthropic and non-profit 
sectors to pursue commercial interests over their social missions (McHugh et al, 2013), as 
well as the risk that the public sector will encourage commercial investors to make social 
investments by offering excessively generous terms. Moreover, it is possible that the 
subcontracted service will be suboptimal compared to a publicly provided service (Mullins et 
al, 2011). 
 
There are now 32 active SIB projects in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2016), and over 100 other 
SIB projects have been planned or started around the world (Vanderwal, 2015) since the first 
SIB was launched at Her Majesty’s Prison Peterborough in the UK in 2010. There is 
significant international policy interest in SIBs, and a growing commentary is emerging about 
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SIBs from proponents, participants, observers and critics. SIBs have split opinion since they 
emerged from UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Council on Social Action in 2007. This 
paper comprehensively reviews the theoretical and empirical academic, and ‘grey’ literature 
on SIBs for the first time, and provides a ‘Critical Interpretive Synthesis’ (Dixon-Woods et 
al, 2006) of the emerging concepts and narratives that underpin this developing policy area. 
The review explores two research questions. Firstly, what are the main themes and concepts 
within the emergent literature on SIBs? Secondly, what broader theories, or lines of 
argument, do different groups writing about SIBs in recent years draw upon? 
 
Methods 
 
Both academic and ‘grey’ literature were included since this is a novel field and it was 
important to synthesise as much of the available literature as possible. Following an initial 
discussion amongst the research team, and an informal review of pieces of ‘grey’ and 
academic literature about SIBs already known to the team, two search strategies were used to 
locate the remaining literature. Firstly, a list of search terms was devised to include the 
different labels used internationally for SIBs. These terms were then used to search a 
selection of electronic databases chosen for their coverage of both academic and grey 
literature. Details of the search terms and databases are given in Table 1. 
Insert table 1 about here 
The search was conducted in March 2015 with no time or language filters. No non-English 
language papers were found. Nothing was found published before 2009. Overall 51,293 
references were retrieved. Of these, 406 deemed potentially relevant based on their titles were 
downloaded into Endnote and duplicates were removed. The abstracts and key words of these 
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406 papers were read and screened through April and May 2015 allowing the exclusion of: 
(1) articles that did not refer to SIBs or any of our other search terms in their title, abstract or 
key words; (2) those that focused on related concepts (e.g. impact investing, Development 
Impact Bonds) but did not refer to SIBs or other similar terms in the body of the text. For 
example, we chose to focus on high-income countries’ experiences because their actors and 
social problems are significantly different from low or middle-income countries thus 
reducing the relevance of Development Impact Bonds; and (3) those which referred to SIBs 
or related terms in the body of the text but were considered not to be analysing SIBs in 
sufficient depth when reviewed by two members of the research team (AF and ST). For 
example, a number of sources referred to SIBs only in passing (i.e. on fewer than three 
occasions in the text). Based on this screening, we identified a total of 87 papers for 
synthesis, comprising 34 academic articles and 53 pieces of ‘grey literature’. 
 
We performed a further search based on the reference lists of these 87 selected papers and 
also received additional recommendations from experts which identified a further 14 papers 
(4 academic and 10 ‘grey’) giving a total of 101 references (38 academic and 63 grey 
literature papers). Two members of the research team then read each paper. Since this was 
primarily an interpretive and conceptual review of a new field, there was no assessment of the 
quality of studies. From each paper, we extracted information on the place and date of 
publication, main focus, study design (where empirical), methods used and key points made. 
Through an iterative process of reading, re-reading and discussing the included primary 
sources, a number of themes, concepts and narratives began to emerge which were 
intellectually linked to broader theories of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; 
Ferlie et al, 1996) and Social Entrepreneurship (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Bugg-Levine and 
Emerson, 2011). 
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Results 
 
Description of studies identified 
 
All 38 academic papers identified (see Appendix 1 for a table showing the different narratives 
which these publications develop) were very recent (published since 2011), with the majority 
emanating from English speaking countries (23 from the US, 11 from the UK, three from 
Canada, and one from Australia). Likewise, the 63 ‘grey’ sources (see Appendix 2 for a table 
showing the different narratives and the sectors from which these publications emerge) were 
very recent, all published since 2010. The vast majority of these came from the UK (38) and 
the US (16). The grey sources included publications by think tanks (8), consultancies – 
including practitioner, intermediary and investment organisations such as Social Finance, an 
intermediary organisation involved in promoting and running SIBs in the UK (13), 
government, or government affiliated organisations (14), civil society organisations, 
including charities (6) and  others – e.g. non-peer reviewed academic reports and speeches 
(8). The majority of papers - both academic and grey – described or commented on SIBs in 
theoretical terms. There were however, 14 publications (mostly located in the ‘grey’ 
literature) describing the early implementation of SIBs or characteristics of SIBs (See 
Appendix 3 for a table summarising the empirical research). Of the 13 qualitative sources on 
active or proposed SIBs, 9 were from the UK, 3 from the US and 1 from Australia. We found 
just one quantitative study reporting on SIB outcomes.  
 
Cross-cutting themes and narratives 
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We identified three major themes in the literature. The first relates to competing public and 
private values. Whilst the concept of competing public and private values is contested and 
dynamic in both theoretical and ideological terms (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003), ‘public 
values’ (Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007) and ‘private values’ (Watson et al, 2004) have 
been analysed across organisations. Empirical comparative work by Van Der Wal et al 
(2008) identified both differences and similarities between values espoused within public and 
private sector organisations in the Netherlands. They found that: ‘‘lawfulness’ , ‘impartiality’ 
and ‘incorruptibility’ were considered the most important public sector values and were 
absent from business’ [private sector’s] top values. ‘Profitability’ and ‘innovativeness’ were 
at the top of business values and absent from the public sector’s top values. ‘Profitability’ 
according to this measure could even be considered the least important public sector value.’ 
(Van Der Wal et al, 2008; p473).  SIBs (through both new funding mechanisms and new 
service delivery relationships) may challenge not only the values supporting the historic ways 
in which services have been delivered by public, non-profit and voluntary providers (through 
clearer outcomes specifications), but also the logics and normative assumptions of the private 
financial services sector (Moore et al, 2012; Nicholls and Murdock, 2012). This raises 
questions about the extent to which the public sphere should be influenced by private sector 
values such as profitability and aligned techniques for resource allocation such as 
competition, market incentives, diversity of providers and new forms of investment, and, in 
turn, whether the dominant values and resource allocation techniques of the financial services 
sector should be reoriented towards more socially minded, ‘blended returns’ rather than 
traditional profit maximisation.  
 
The second theme relates to the introduction of, or increased primacy given to, outcome 
measurement in public services’ contracting as a result of financing mechanisms like SIBs. 
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Whilst there are conflicting views about the utility derived from, and the impacts of, new 
regimes of measurement outside the SIB literature, both proponents and critics of SIBs tend 
to be in broad (though not universal) agreement about the potential benefits of a shift to 
outcomes-focused measurement. The third theme relates to the transfer and calculation of risk 
amongst different actors through SIB mechanisms, and the ideological and practical 
implications that this may have for specific services and policy more broadly.  
 
Through the interrogation of these themes, we identified emerging ‘lines of argument’ 
(Dixon-Woods et al, 2006); that is, broader, theoretically distinct narratives that differentiate 
the approaches taken by groups of authors and policy actors. This was a reflexive, iterative 
process and involved going beyond the SIB-specific texts into the wider theoretical literature 
in accordance with the principles of interpretive synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al, 2006). We 
identified three theoretically distinct narratives about SIBs: a public sector reform narrative 
located within broader theories of NPM; a private financial sector reform narrative located 
within broader theories of Social Entrepreneurship; and a cautionary narrative sceptical of 
public and financial sector developments such as NPM and Social Entrepreneurship, and thus 
of SIBs. There are some significant elements of convergence between the first two narratives 
(see Appendix 2) which dominate the grey literature and highlight the political salience of 
SIBs and how they have come to be seen as ‘win-win’ options by some proponents, 
particularly in the context of public sector financial austerity in the UK following the 2008 
financial crisis. In contrast, the third cautionary narrative was more prevalent within the 
academic literature, and diverges from the first two by taking a more critical view of SIBs on 
pragmatic and ideological grounds (see Appendix 1). These three narratives are described and 
explored in relation to the three themes of values, outcomes measurement and risk, identified 
above.  
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The public sector reform narrative 
 
This narrative starts from the premise that public, non-profit and voluntary sector 
organisations have important shortcomings in terms of service design, delivery and 
accountability, and have so far been unable to find solutions to entrenched social 
problems. Public sector reform advocates therefore promote the application of private 
sector management techniques and values, such as introducing market incentives and 
‘market discipline’ to remedy these issues (Mulgan et al, 2011; HM Government, 2011; 
2013; Liebman, 2011). From this perspective, SIBs relate to a belief in the exposure of 
more activities to competitive tendering and the application of private sector-influenced 
audit systems (Power, 1999), as well as the fostering of entrepreneurship in the public 
sector (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). For example, Ronald Cohen, one of the main UK 
advocates of SIBs, argues that ‘[S]ocial enterprise and impact investment could 
dramatically change the role of the social sector in the way that venture capital and 
business entrepreneurship did in mainstream business in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Cohen, 
2011). Whilst this view aligns with ‘pro-market’ and NPM values (Hood, 1991; Ferlie et 
al, 1996), SIBs (as part of a broader trend towards innovation in service delivery and 
socially-minded investment) go further by creating the space for the potential symbiosis 
between the public, private, non-profit and voluntary sectors. For example, Callanan and 
Law (2012), in a report produced by McKinsey & Company, amongst the earliest such 
reports from the consultancy sector, emphasise that social innovation occurs ‘at the 
intersection of the public, private, and social sectors.’ From this perspective, the 
opportunity offered by SIBs to merge public and private values is seen as advantageous. 
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The public sector reform narrative presents SIBs as an extension of outcomes-based 
contracting and payment for performance in public services (Lagarde et al, 2013). The aim of 
outcomes-based contracting is to incentivise managers and service providers through 
performance pay or outcomes payments which reflect the extent to which pre-agreed metrics 
of success are achieved. Thus, SIB contracts create a mechanism to improve the ways in 
which non-profit and voluntary sector organisations measure their performance (Cox, 2011; 
Liebman, 2011), and, in theory, they introduce greater accountability between commissioners 
and service providers by setting clearer expectations of what funds will be used to achieve 
(Stoesz, 2014). Grey literature produced by individual charities and umbrella groups 
emphasises how SIBs may offer them strategic opportunities to innovate, collaborate, and 
capitalise upon the changed economic and policy context following the banking crisis of 
2008 and subsequent public spending cuts through increased engagement with intermediary 
organisations, and a focus on outcomes and measurement on the part of commissioners 
(Fitzpatrick & Thorne, 2010; Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014; Joy et al, 2011; Seymour, 2010; 
Roberts, 2013; Thomas, 2013; Eames et al, 2014). Outcomes-based contracts tend to be 
longer-term than the traditional block service contracts offered directly to service providers, 
so a proposed advantage of SIBs is that they offer more financial stability to non-profit and 
voluntary sector organisations delivering these services. Moreover, as the contracts are 
outcomes-, not process-based, it is said that they can lead to increased innovation and greater 
personalisation of services (Social Enterprise UK, 2013; Leventhal, 2012; Jackson, 2013; 
Clark et al, 2014). 
 
The public sector reform narrative also highlights the potential for SIBs to transfer the 
financial risk of failure for interventions – that might otherwise be seen as too experimental 
or risky for traditional forms of public funding – from the state to private/social investors. 
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This is said to be appealing as the state does not need, in theory, to release any public funds 
unless projects demonstrate success and, even then, payments should come out of savings to 
public budgets as a direct result of the SIB-financed intervention through the prevention of 
‘downstream’ social problems (Mulgan et al, 2011; Social Finance, 2011b; Callanan and 
Law, 2012; Rotheroe et al, 2013). This argument is frequently articulated in UK government 
publications, which particularly stress the potential virtues of SIBs by emphasising how they 
may foster innovation, and prevent, or ameliorate complex social problems. These potential 
benefits are seen as particularly salient in the contemporary policy climate given the current 
cuts in public spending on public services in the UK (Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014; Dodd and 
Moody, 2011; Jackson, 2013; Young Foundation and NESTA, 2011), because SIBs have the 
potential to transfer risk from the public sector to the private sector (HM Government, 2011; 
2013; Cabinet Office, 2013). 
 
The private financial sector reform narrative 
 
The financial sector reform narrative adopts the perspective of private actors. It proposes that 
blending public and private values will offer private sector actors (particularly financial 
institutions) an opportunity to effect socially worthwhile change through Social 
Entrepreneurship whilst simultaneously pursuing commercial interests (Social Investment 
Task Force, 2010; Cohen, 2011; Leibman, 2011; Mosenson, 2013; Nicholls and Murdoch, 
2012; Moore et al, 2012). Advocates of Social Entrepreneurship see this as part of a wider 
move toward more socially responsible investment and business practices globally (Porter 
and Kramer, 2006; Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011). Through a demonstration of its social 
usefulness, it is argued that the anti-social, dangerous aspects of financial capitalism may be 
offset (Shiller, 2013), and SIBs may enable investors to improve their public image (Barajas 
13 
 
et al, 2014). Whilst this aligns with conventional notions of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), Social Entrepreneurship’s proponents and observers suggest that there needs to be a 
more fundamental cultural change in approaches to investment, to which SIBs could 
contribute (Nicholls, 2013). Social impact investing through SIBs also offers a new potential 
revenue stream for private financiers (Wilson, 2014). If and where SIBs might prove to be 
effective, they will also supply investors with a return on their investment, which, whilst 
theoretically being based on ‘savings’, nevertheless comes from public funds. Thus the 
private financial sector could gain access to more public funds in a similar way to the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), a type of contract popular in the UK introduced in the 1990s 
allowing private finance to fund capital investment in public infrastructure projects (e.g. new 
hospitals and prisons) (Sussex, 2001) and other mechanisms of private contracting for public 
services. The commentary on SIBs suggests that such access to public revenue streams could 
be made lucrative if they were included in risk-adjusted portfolios destined for the social or 
impact investment market (Lehner & Brandstetter, 2014).  
 
The financial sector reform narrative emphasises the expertise that new players such as 
management consultancies and specialist intermediaries, in particular, may bring in linking 
public, private, non-profit and voluntary sector actors for a fee. These intermediaries are seen 
as crucial to the implementation of SIBs (Bafford, 2012; Haffar, 2014). For example, they are 
expected to bring enhanced data monitoring techniques and skills to non-profit and voluntary 
sector providers which have traditionally been thought to have limited capacity to monitor 
their own behaviour and validate achieved outcomes (Callanan and Law, 2012). The central 
importance of extensive, ongoing performance monitoring and concurrent independent 
evaluation by external actors is emphasised in the literature by many authors as a way of 
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ensuring that outcome payments are earned in a valid and attributable way (Cox, 2011; 
Burand, 2012; Leventhal, 2012; Nicholls, 2013). 
 
The financial sector reform narrative further articulates a strong desire to see the social 
impact investment market ‘grow’ (HM Government, 2011; 2013; Liebman, 2011; Cohen, 
2011; Clark et al, 2014). However, there is a distinction between those who see SIBs as a 
niche for pro-social investors who will take higher risks and smaller returns in contrast to 
those who desire guaranteed returns or higher yields in the evolving social investment field. 
A number of authors suggest that if social investment and social entrepreneurship are to grow 
beyond their niche status, there needs to be greater standardisation in how social impact is 
measured, communicated, and assessed for risk (Antadze and Wesley, 2012; Nicholls, 2013), 
for example, through the use of instruments such as the Global Impact Investing Rating 
System, and Impact Investing and Reporting Standards (Bugg-Levine and Emerson 2011). 
Liebman (2011), a key proponent of SIBs, sees them as an ‘impact first’ opportunity for 
potential investors (in which the primary aim is a social return on investment), rather than a 
‘finance first’ opportunity (in which the primary aim is a financial return on investment). 
Nevertheless, a significant strand of this literature focuses on how the risk to investors can be 
made sufficiently attractive to incentivise them to invest in the nascent market. These 
discussions focus on ways to reduce the level, and uncertainty, of the risk to investors 
(Bafford 2012, Cox 2011; Burand 2012; Leventhal 2012; Dagher 2013; Shiller 2013). 
 
The cautionary narrative 
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In contrast to the generally positive public sector and private sector reform narratives, the 
cautionary narrative questions the appropriateness of ‘private sector’ values and mechanisms 
in the field of public services. A number of authors suggest that SIBs represent a further 
extension of neoliberal logic in public policy (Warner, 2012; 2013; Whitfield, 2012; McHugh 
et al, 2013; Malcolmson, 2014; Sinclair et al, 2014). Lake (2015), for example, draws on the 
notion of financialization to highlight the destructive potential of SIB logic in urban policy 
making in the US. Financialization is the process whereby both macroeconomic and public 
policy making are subordinated to financial sector interests. In this way, public policy simply 
exists to support, stabilise, or expand the economy rather than to meet social needs (Lake, 
2015). For a number of authors, SIBs represent the inappropriate intrusion of private sector 
and financialized values in social policy, and a reversion to pre-welfare state methods of 
service funding and provision. Dowling and Harvie (2014) discuss the rise of SIBs in the 
context of the 2010-15 UK government’s Big Society agenda. These voices are also critical of 
the financial and intermediary organisations at the vanguard of ‘venture philanthropy’ and the 
way that the SIB social investment model utilises (often unpaid) charitable work for social 
ends whilst also pursuing profit for investors (Dowling and Harvie, 2014).  
 
SIBs are also criticised for diminishing transparency in the use of public funds. Warner 
(2012) emphasises the relative ‘openness’ of public sector contract making and contrasts this 
with the closed nature of private sector contracts like SIBs that are not publicly disclosed for 
reasons of commercial sensitivity. She suggests that a degree of public oversight is essential 
to ensure accountability to citizens and taxpayers in relation to these contracts, as private 
sector investors or providers may place profit motives above the interests of service 
recipients. Others have expressed concerns that allowing private financiers to foster a 
competitive ethos and introduce performance management regimes to non-profit and 
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voluntary sector provider organisations may lead to a diminution, or distortion, of their social 
mission (Joy and Shields, 2013). These critics also stress that, in the worst case, these 
contracts may be a precursor to the full privatisation of service provision and can diminish 
the advocacy roles that non-profit organisations play in civil society because a reliance on 
long-term government sanctioned contracts may ultimately impinge on their independence 
(McHugh et al, 2013; Whitfield, 2012; Joy and Shields, 2013).  
 
For the most part, the cautionary narrative is favourably disposed, in principle, to the focus on 
outcomes-based contracting central to SIBs. Fox and Albertson have written extensively on 
SIBs and their application to the criminal justice sector and probation services in the UK (Fox 
and Albertson, 2011; 2012; Fox, Albertson & Wong, 2013), and suggest that a strength of 
SIBs is that, by reducing reliance on process measurement, they challenge the output ‘target 
culture’ associated with the NPM. Indeed, from this perspective, the shift from process to 
outcome measures aligns SIBs to an ‘evidence based’ approach where what matters is what 
works (Deering, 2014). However, there is recognition that outcome measures need to be very 
carefully defined and calibrated by commissioners, providers, and investors (Warner, 2012; 
2013). The focus on measurement also raises significant questions about the attribution of 
outcomes to the actions of providers and financiers, and how any ‘SIB effect’ can adequately 
be interpreted and validated (Fox and Albertson, 2011; Fitzgerald, 2013; McHugh et al, 2013; 
Sinclair et al, 2014).  
 
Finally, the cautionary narrative emphasises the problems inherent in calculating risk in SIB 
contracts. McKay (2013a; 2013b) evaluated a number of risk-cost scenarios in a proposed 
SIB in Maryland aimed at reducing recidivism, and concluded that, in this setting, the 
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government would increase operational risks by using a SIB model through increased 
transactions costs and greater contractual complexity. Pauly and Swanson (2013) suggest that 
risk calculations are likely to be highly context-specific, making it difficult to benefit from 
the accumulation of past experience in SIB investing, thereby maintaining the complexity of 
the process of establishing SIBs. SIB projects in the UK have benefited from government 
support – for example, through the Social Outcomes Fund, Commissioning Better Outcomes 
Fund, Fair Chance Fund, Innovation Fund and Youth Engagement Fund (Cabinet Office, 
2015). Famously, the New York Rikers Island SIB project was underwritten by Bloomberg 
philanthropy in order to secure Goldman Sachs’ investment (Warner, 2012). This suggests 
that private sector investors may be more risk-averse than some SIB proponents have claimed 
and are likely to require government or philanthropic funds to guarantee, or underwrite their 
investment, to reduce their financial  risk if they choose to invest in a SIB. 
 
Early Empirical findings   
 
 
In this section, we report findings from 14 mainly qualitative studies reporting on SIB 
projects, mostly from the UK and the US (see Appendix 3 for details of actual and 
prospective SIB projects described). Many of these early empirical studies were funded by 
government agencies keen to explore SIBs as an innovative option for public sector reform. 
Reflecting this, the studies are largely framed within the public sector reform narrative in that 
they focus on how services funded through a SIB may foster innovation and improvements in 
outcomes in policy areas where previous public or non-profit and voluntary sector provision 
was deemed problematic.  
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The process evaluations of SIBs in different countries and policy areas have identified a 
considerable number of challenges associated with setting up SIBs and establishing 
outcomes-based contracts. First, they frequently point to the difficulty of agreeing what 
should be measured in the contracts - by whom and how often - as well as the length of time 
needed to establish SIB contracts among the parties involved (KPMG, 2014; Tan et al, 2015; 
DWP, 2014; DCLG, 2014; 2015; Disley et al, 2011). This literature reflects on the potential 
difficulties of the negotiations surrounding SIB outcomes-based contracts. These challenges 
are attributed to a combination of: the intrinsic complexity of SIBs; the novelty of the 
process; how SIBs often involve innovative services; and the fact that contracting for 
outcomes raises new issues for the actors involved and requires substantial discussions to 
account for all possible contingencies. The reports on the SIB at Peterborough Prison in the 
UK highlighted the extent of the discussions that continued even after the contract had been 
signed (Disley et al, 2011; Disley and Rubin, 2014), specifically relating to the statistical 
methods used to measure outcomes, the definition of the beneficiaries, the limitations of the 
data on outcomes (Jolliffe and Hederman, 2014), and the need to account for changing 
circumstances over time (Disley et al, 2011; Disley and Rubin, 2014). More recent empirical 
studies of UK pilot SIBs suggest that robust counterfactual groups are often hard to find and 
thus not prevalent in approaches to evaluating or measuring their outcomes (Tan et al, 2015; 
DWP, 2014). This has also been highlighted as a growing problem for SIB development in 
the US (Butler et al, 2013).  
 
Discussion 
 
This review has brought together the academic and ‘grey’ literature on SIBs from high-
income countries in the form of an interpretive synthesis. Overall, there is a paucity of 
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evidence about SIBs – most of the material identified is best described as commentary. 
Nevertheless, we identified three main themes in the 101 sources which met the inclusion 
criteria – the role of public versus private values, the importance of outcomes contracting, 
and the problematic nature of calculating and allocating risk for SIB projects. We also 
identified three distinct narratives in the literature on SIBs – a public sector reform narrative, 
a private financial sector reform narrative and a cautionary narrative. The small number of 
predominantly qualitative empirical studies of SIB projects (under development and signed) 
focused on difficulties in establishing SIBs and determining measurable outcomes. In this 
final section, we reflect on the appeal of SIBs for policymakers and analyse the respective 
plausibility and relative logic of each of our three identified narratives; next, we question 
what the enthusiasm of policymakers may overlook; and, finally, we highlight issues that 
policymakers may wish to consider carefully as SIBs develop.  
 
In recent years, SIBs have spread across a range of public policy domains in a number of 
countries, promoted on the basis that they can offer ‘win-win’ solutions to governments, 
investors, service providers and service users. The appeal of SIBs as a financing mechanism 
aligns with the wider public sector reform goals of the NPM movement (Warner, 2012). 
Paying for outcomes achieved rather than relying on process measures or upfront payments 
for services delivered is part of a longer term trend to increase accountability through 
reimbursement tools that enable explicit performance measurement. Furthermore, for its 
proponents, the SIB represents a fresh alignment or collaboration between private finance, 
non-government providers and public service commissioners which cuts through traditional 
public, private and non-profit barriers (Callanan and Law, 2012). For policymakers, the logic 
of the SIB lies in the potential it may hold to foster greater financial sector involvement with 
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respect to both financing and knowledge exchange to augment public and non-profit service 
delivery.  
 
In the absence of much empirical data, very little quantitative evaluation of impacts versus 
the status quo and the fact that most operational SIBs are in the early implementation stage, 
we are left to assess the respective plausibility of each these narratives from what is already 
known in related fields. The public sector reform narrative can appear plausible (for example, 
to policy makers and commissioners of services) provided one is confident in the superior 
effectiveness of third and private sector providers and the superiority of outcome-based 
contracts over more conventional forms. However, the evidence suggests that use of other 
than public sector providers is no guarantee of superior performance (Dunleavy et al, 2006) 
and that performance-related contracts have mixed success (NAO, 2015). The financial sector 
reform narrative is likely to underestimate the tension between the aims and objectives of 
'finance first' and 'impact first' investment models, as well as the many challenges involved in 
tackling complex social problems, which may not necessarily be solved more cost-effectively 
by better management or private sector expertise.  
 
By contrast, the cautionary narrative emanating mostly from actors not directly party to SIB 
market development, is currently closest to the limited evidence available (Tan et al, 2015) 
since it identifies the new challenges created by SIBs which can be seen in the research on 
SIB implementation. While private financing via SIBs might help commissioners manage the 
financial risks associated with commissioning innovative responses to embedded social 
problems, they are still faced with the operational and reputational risks associated with 
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failure since the responsibility for tackling these issues ultimately rests with the public 
commissioner. From this perspective, the benefits of SIBs may be more limited than 
anticipated. 
 
The enthusiasm some policymakers have for SIBs may overlook some problematic issues 
with the policy. Firstly, as highlighted above, performance-related funding of service 
providers is no panacea for poor service delivery (NAO, 2015) and there is limited empirical 
evidence that payment for performance or payment by results delivers better outcomes than 
conventional reimbursement methods when applied to public services (Lagarde et al, 2013). 
This has been explored in health at the primary (Campbell et al, 2007) and secondary health 
care level (Kristensen et al, 2013), and also in education (Podgursky & Springer 2007).  
There is also much evidence on UK government outsourcing and subcontracting that 
highlights serious failures therein (King & Crewe, 2014). Furthermore, authors such as 
Mazzucato (2013) highlight the relative superiority of the public sector to innovate and take 
risks. Secondly, it is possible that over time, outcome measures may develop their own 
‘tyrannical’ implications just as process measures did for professionals and service providers 
previously, where the need to work towards specified outcome metrics may come to be seen 
as targets that dominate performance management regimes. Thirdly, as already highlighted in 
the early SIBs, there is potential for creaming or more explicit ‘gaming’ (DWP, 2014), 
especially if outcomes or the target population are not carefully specified in a SIB contract. 
Fourthly, SIBs may side-line service user interests and pose questions around democratic 
accountability (Joy and Shields, 2013; Warner, 2013). Finally, it is not known what the 
impact of financial incentives will be on service delivery organisations, particularly on the 
organisational missions or ethos of non-profit service providers (Joy and Shields, 2013), 
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however, there is reason to be circumspect (Stout, 2014). Furthermore, whilst commissioners 
can indeed defer payments for services using SIBs – they will still have to budget to pay in 
the end since they cannot guarantee that savings equal to the outcome premia will necessarily 
be realised even if outcome targets are met - and might (as with the PFI experience in the 
UK) end up paying more than if they had commissioned the service in a more conventional 
way. Many of the savings in SIB schemes appear to be based on hypothetical rather than real 
cost reductions, are complicated to calculate and in the absence of (quasi) experimental 
impact evaluations, hard to attribute (Tan et al, 2015).  
 
Given these issues, it remains important that policymakers considering a SIB contract make a 
realistic ex ante assessment of the likely benefits and drawbacks of a SIB in each case rather 
than assuming that any SIB will deliver a ‘win-win’ solution (Giacomantonio, forthcoming). 
To date, across all active SIBs, there has been very little rigorous counterfactual comparison 
of SIBs versus alternative methods of finance to deliver the same service to the same type of 
users, and thus a lack of evidence of costs and benefits compared with the alternative 
approach to procurement. Given that SIBs are expected to bring more rigour in measurement 
and performance monitoring to the non-profit and voluntary sector, the lack of quantitative 
data and evidenced cashable savings is worrisome. It is hoped that the future implementation 
of SIBs will allow researchers to assess whether, and, if so, the extent to which SIBs bring 
about the benefits espoused by their proponents and how this is done. This may be achieved 
through longitudinal comparative mixed-method studies of the same services provided by the 
same providers through SIB and non-SIB funding mechanisms, for example, by drawing on 
in depth qualitative interviews with service users, provider organisations, commissioners, 
intermediaries and investors. It will also require detailed examination of SIB contracts and 
access to high quality quantitative data about the target population, and ideally, also a 
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counterfactual group, and where possible, randomised controlled trials (RCTs). There is a 
need for careful ex ante consideration of the complex balance of risks, drawbacks and 
benefits in each case, and far more empirical studies ex post.  
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